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Abstract:
Bitcoin is a digital cryptocurrency that has attracted substantial interest in recent years from the
general people, profit seekers, risk takers, academic practitioners and last but not the least, from
economists. Most recently, particularly, after 2015, it has succeeded to gain even more attention
for increase in value and volume of exchange. The Bitcoin system maintains a global, distributed
cryptographic ledger of transactions, or blockchain, through a consensus algorithm running on
hardware  scattered  across  the  world.  This  paper  basically  discusses  on  the  nature  of
cryptocurrency & blockchain, how it works and present status of bitcoin blockchain in different
countries around the world. The various aspects this technology in detail is yet to be revealed.
The authors hope that this simple, basic and narrative paper will be helpful for those seeking the
basic references regarding this newest issue.
Keywords:  Bitcoin,  Blockchain,  Cryptocurrency,  Internet,  Trading,  Mining,  Block,
Transaction.
1. Bitcoin: An introduction:    
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency mainly used for monetary transactions on the internet
(Nakamoto, 2014) and is intended to be similar to flat money and commodities. Bitcoins are
inherently valueless, their worth is determined by those trading in them (O’Dwyer and Malone,
2014). It has generated a massive amount of interest in the media recently and has sparked a
wave of copy-cat-currencies (Litecoin, Gaelcoin, etc.) and even a fully working parody currency
(dogecoin). It has also generated interest in intellectual circles owing to issues it creates in user
privacy (Androulaki et al., 2013), as well as attempts to gain insights into is behind transactions
(Meiklejohn et al., 2013) and attempts to better understand its implications as a payment system
Karame et al., 2012).
It is a kind of digital currency in which encryption techniques are used to control the generation
of units of currency and verify the transfer of funds, operating independently of a central bank.
Bitcoins are produced by users who ‘mine’ them by lending computing power to verify other
users’ transactions and are stored in a “digital wallet”, which exists either in the cloud or on a
user’s computer. The wallet is a kind of virtual bank account that allows users to send or receive
bitcoins,  pay  for  goods  or  save  their  money  (Anderson  et  al.,  2017).  The  major  difference
between physical currency (e.g. GBP or US dollar) and bitcoin or between bank accounts and
bitcoin  wallets  is  that  the  former  ones  are  insured  by the  Financial  Services  Compensation
Scheme in the UK or The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the US whereas the latter
one are not.
Fundamental to bitcoin is a public ledger, acknowledged as the blockchain. At the beginning, a
new “block” was added to this chain or ledger every 10 minutes (although it can take over an
hour  today).  This  ledger  records  all  of  the  transactions  that  have  occurred  as  well  as  the
quantities of bitcoin are in possession at  singular public  addresses having each public  one a
related classified key. The owner of the private key has the authority to transfer the digital coins
that are held at that specific address only. Each key is 51 characters long in the same format as a
public  address.  To  spend  an  amount  of  bitcoin,  one  must  use  his/her  private  key  to
cryptographically sign the transaction, sending the bitcoin to another address. This message or
transaction is then transmitted to the network, and the computers in the network begin working to
record that the address no longer has the amount that was sent, but is now held at the receiving
address. All of the computers that are working to write new blocks to the blockchain, are known
as miners. These computers are all racing to solve a cryptographic puzzle, which is required to
write the new block. The computer that solves the algorithm and writes the new block, receives
an award of newly created bitcoin (now worth over $7,000 each) (Anderson et al., 2017). 
2. The concept of blockchain: 
Blockchain is the core technology behind bitcoin. It is a disseminated, decentralized database
and is designed to accomplish consistent and reliable agreement over a record of events between
independent participants. Participants in a blockchain network get to agreement about changes to
the state of the shared database without needing to trust the integrity of any network participants
or administrators. Anyone who participates in the blockchain network has their own data store
that  stores  all  of  the  transactions  that  ever  happened  on  the  network  (also  known  as  the
distributed ledger) (Anderson et al., 2017).
Transaction  entries  are  recorded within  a  cryptographic  chain  of  blocks.  At  each stage,  the
networks  of  participants  are  required  to  agree  about  the  most  recent  block  of  transactions.
Agreement is reached through a process of mass consent, eliminating duplicate entries and dual
spending. This process and the cryptographic layering of the blocks make the agreed blockchain
irretrievable  and  unchallengeable.  The  ‘history’  of  events  within  the  blockchain  cannot  be
tailored by any one of the participants without majority consensus from the group. This is vitally
important to prevent the ‘double-spending’ difficulty (i.e. the same digital file being copied and
transferred multiple  times) without requiring a centralized ledger or third party that prevents
users from duplicating/spending the same digital file twice. Blockchains can thus aid the transfer
of assets and other data without needing a trusted central authority (like banks or other financial
institutions).
The ability of blockchain system participants to autonomously authenticate the reliability of the
shared  database  without  having  to  rely  on  a  trusted  third  party  is  one  of  the  main  value
propositions of using the blockchain. Blockchains hold the promise of dropping the trust gap by
making  actions  within  the  system  autonomously  verifiable  by  each  participant,  improving
accountability, and dis-incentivizing misbehavior through public audit ability. In other words, the
rules governing a blockchain can successfully eliminate the types of unauthorized transfers or
deceptive  activity  that  have  become  all  too  frequent  in  many  areas  of  business  and
society(Anderson et al., 2017).
3. Bitcoin and blockchain: How the system works?
This  segment  provides  a  simple  explanation  of  the  blockchain  protocol  that  is  the  basis  of
Bitcoin system and also, is the foundation of many other cryptocurrencies. Describing focuses on
the economic  elements  and to explain what  the Bitcoin  system does,  it  would be helpful  to
explain  initially  what  is  required  for  a  payment  system  such  as  PayPal,  FedWire  or  the
continuance of electronic balances in a modern bank. An electronic payment system functions as
a record (or a ledger) of accounts that is connected with a user and his balance. It allows users to
check their balances and allows debiting his balance and crediting the debited amount to another
account. Only an account owner can debit the account and the balances do not change without a
legal transfer, e.g., a transfer that conforms to the system’s stated rules.
One uncomplicated accomplishment is just a spread-sheet (or another bookkeeping device) that
only a trusted authority can change. Allowing multiple computers to maintain and update the
ledger  requires  a  more  complicated  structure.  This  distributed  ledger  structure  requires
synchronization across the servers, which is, in principle, more robust than a single server system
(Narayanan et al., 2016).
Maintaining harmony in a distributed computer system has been known to be straightforward, as
long as the computers are trusted (Tanenbaum and Van Steen, 2007)). The Bitcoin system is
intended  for  an  environment  which  lacks  a  trusted  authority.  Therefore,  its  ledger  must  be
maintained and updated by a collection of computer servers, called miners, none of which is
trusted (Huberman et al.,  2017).  They are assumed to be profit  oriented,  e.g.,  to  respond to
incentives in a proﬁt maximizing way. Moreover, they offer or withdraw their services according
to profit seeking opportunities they perceive. Although, legal transactions are in procession of
untrusted miners, the system as a whole is very secure, that is, it processes all legal transactions.
The collection of miners jointly holds a single ledger, meaning that there must be consensus
among  miners  about  current  balances.  Moreover,  consensus  must  be maintained as  balances
change. Bitcoin’s ledger is a public database called blockchain, which can be verified by third
parties through cryptography. The system arranges for the miners to be compensated for their
services in such a way that when each of them maximizes his proﬁt; and believes that other
miners similarly maximize their profits too (Huberman et al., 2017).
Initially, all balances are at zero. Over time, the protocol mints new coins which it adds to the
balances of winning miners holding the record of all balance changes. The demonstration of a
transaction is a message which a sending account transmits to all the miners stating the sending
account, receiving account, amount transferred, transaction fee, and a cryptographic signature by
the sending account. A transaction is processed by adding the appropriate message to the end of
the ledger. The cryptographic signature allows any third party to verify that the transaction was
indeed authorized by the holder of the sending account. Since the ledger is public, any third party
can verify that the sender indeed held a balance enough for the transfer. The public ledger is
saved in the shared blockchain format where the transaction data is partitioned into a series of
blocks.  These blocks are periodic updates to the ledger.  Notably,  the ledger does not update
instantly following the appearance of a new transaction. Rather, it updates on average every ten
minutes with a block summarizing a subset of the recent pending transactions which hadn’t been
included in a previous block. Remaining unprocessed transactions wait to be processed in future
blocks (Huberman et al., 2017). The maximum block size is 1MB. To ensure each block can be
transmitted promptly throughout the network, the protocol limits each block to 1MB of data. As
of July 2017, this limits each block to no more than approximately 2,000 transactions, as the
average transaction uses 0.5KB of data (Zohar, 2015).
New transactions are processed when they are incorporated in a block that is added to the ledger,
where,  each  miner  holds  a  duplicate  of  the  present  ledger  e.g.,  all  preceding  blocks.  All
transaction requests are transmitted to all miners. The set of awaiting transactions that get to each
miner may differ a little across miners due to network imperfections, rendering non-trivial the
choice of a unanimously agreed upon record of transactions. To ensure that bitcoin maintains an
exclusive record of transactions, a solo miner is selected to add a block of transactions to the
ledger. As there is no trusted authority to make the selection, a competition is used to randomly
select a winning miner. To participate in the tournament miners exert effort (known as proof of
work) that is practical merely for generating a verifiable random selection of a miner without the
need of a trusted randomization device (Huberman et al., 2017). 
Periodically (currently approximately every 10 minutes), the tournament aimlessly selects one
miner as the winner, assigning his block as the next in the chain, thereby making that block a
mined block. The mined block is transmitted to all the other miners, who verify the legality of
that block and vet all transactions included in the block. Miners add a newly mined legal block to
their copy of the ledger and proceed to add new blocks on top of it, ignoring mined blocks that
are not legal (Huberman et al., 2017). 
The tournament-winning miner is paid a reward when he mines a new block, but can withdraw
his reward only after newer blocks augment the chain on top of his block. Other miners will
build on top of his block only if they consider it legal incentivizing to assemble and create legal
blocks. Consensus forms on a ledger that includes the new block. The process continues in the
same manner for the following ten minutes (on average) and so on (Eyal and Sirer, 2014)
The miner that produced a block is paid from two sources: one consists of newly minted coins
the  exact  number  of  which  is  protocol-determined  and  is  decreasing  with  time  (Crediting
successful miners with newly minted coins moves the system early on from having zero balances
to having positive ones) and the second consists of the fees offered by the transactions in the
mined block (Huberman et al., 2017). 
According to Huberman et al., (2017), this system will have the following desired properties: 
1. All miners are synchronized to hold the same ledger of processed transactions. 
2. No single miner controls the system, because every 10 minutes the ability to process
transactions is given to a randomly chosen miner. 
3. Balances change only with a legal transaction because any transaction that is added is
vetted by other miners to be valid, and transactions cannot be deleted from the ledger.
4. Related Literature:
As a relatively new concept, there are few previous literatures regarding bitcoin and blockchain,
although  they are  being  attracted  the  by curiosity  of  the  researchers  very recently  and it  is
continuing  to  do  so.  A  relatively  few  number  of  authors  investigated  these  issues.  On  the
following sections such investigative experiments are highlighted:
4.1 Engineering of bitcoin:
Table-1: Literatures on bitcoin engineering
Author (s) Year of
investigation
Topic of investigation
Nakamoto 2008 First identified the name “Bitcoin” described the Bitcoin system.
Babaioﬀ et al. 2012 Explained the incentives to distribute information in the Bitcoin system
Kroll et al. 2013 Oﬀered a description of the incentives faced by participants in the bitcoin
system,  especially  the  incentives  faced  by miners,  thus,  concluding  a
brief discussion of transaction fees.
Eyal & Sirer 2014 Analyzed the regularity between miners.
Sapirshtein et al. 2016 Established  to  proposition  that  appropriate  design  of  the  blockchain
protocol produces a dependable system in equilibrium if all miners are
significantly small.
Narayanan et al. 2016 Offered a sophisticated explanation and analysis of the bitcoin system
Croman et al. 2016 Provided cost estimates for the Bitcoin system and analyzed the potential
for transaction throughout.
Eyal et al. 2016 Suggested  another  design  aimed  to  develop  a  system  with  a  higher
transaction throughout.
Carlsten et al. 2016 Analyzed how incentives for miners change when they are rewarded with
transaction fees instead of newly created coins.
Chiu & Koeppl 2017 Evaluated  the  welfare  implications  of  printing  new coins,  adopting  a
mostly experimental orientation
Easley et al. 2017 Explained contemporary designing and performance of blockchain  
Huberman et al. 2017 Explained  the  economics  behind  the  bitcoin  system:  How  does  the
system raise revenue to pay for its infrastructure? How are usage fees
determined?  How  much  infrastructure  is  deployed?  What  are  the
implications of changing parameters in the protocol?
4.2 Bitcoin usage as a currency and the cryptocurrency market:
Table-2: Literatures on Bitcoin usage as a currency and the cryptocurrency market
Author (s) Year of
investigation
Topic of investigation
Yermack 2013 Reviewed the history of Bitcoin and the statistical properties of its price
history arguing that it does not behave much like a currency according to
the  criteria  widely  used  by  economists.  Rather,  bitcoin  resembles  a
speculative investment similar to the Internet stocks of the late 1990s.
Ron & Shamir 2013 Provided analysis of the usage of Bitcoin and its value as a currency.
Gandal & Halaburda 2014 Analyzed competition between the various cryptocurrencies.
Gans & Halaburda 2015 Analyzed  the  economics  of  digital  currencies,  focusing  on  platform
sponsored credits.
Athey et al. 2016 Explained the theory of bitcoin and using it as a currency.
Catalini & Gans 2016 Discussed  possible  opportunities  that  can  arise  from  blockchain
technology.
4.3 Related work in queuing theory:
Lui (1985), Glazer & Hassin (1986), and Hassin (1995) studied a queuing system in which users
with various waiting costs volunteer to pay transaction fees (termed bribes in Lui 1985) in order
to  gain  priority  in  a  queue  to  solo  service  station  which  serves  customers  once  at  a  time
(Huberman et al., 2017). The main observation of Lui is that the server may amplify its revenues
by raising the speed of service. Hassin (1995) showed that the service rate that maximizes the
server’s profit is always slower than the socially optimal service rate. Hassin & Haviv (2003)
provide a summary of the results, and Hassin (2016) provided an updated review. The present
analysis considers a queuing system where transaction arrival and service arrival is stochastic,
but the service is done is batch mode of fixed maximal size. The prior work corresponds to a
batch size of one. The interaction among the arrival and service rates and the maximal batch size
and their impact on the transaction fees and server’s revenues are of major concern (Huberman et
al., 2017). Independently, Kasahara & Kawahara (2017) analyzed delays in a priority queuing
system with batch service inspired by bitcoin, but do not consider user incentives or equilibrium
considerations.
4.4 Work on competition, monopoly and its regulation:
The social welfare implications of monopolistic vs. competitive provision of a good or service is
of innermost concern to economic analysis,  often leading to a debate regarding the extent to
which regulation is desired and the best means through which to accomplish it (Huberman et al.,
2017).  According to Posner (1975),  a model  of the social  cost  of monopoly and monopoly-
inducing regulation (Narayanan et  al.,  2016) assumes that  competition to obtain a monopoly
results in a conversion of monopoly profits into social costs. A major conclusion is that public
regulation is perhaps a larger source of social cost than private monopoly.  A Posner-inspired
explanation of mining is that when a block is completed, e. g., the hard riddle has been solved by
one  of  the  miners,  the  solving  miner  is  a  monopolistic  winner  who  takes  all  the  revenues
associated with the completion  of that block.  The social  cost  of one miner’s  winning is  the
amount spent by the community of miners to try to solve the hard puzzle. Noteworthy is that the
monopolist is not a price-setter, contrasting with standard monopoly models, including Posner’s
(Huberman et al., 2017).
5. Present status of bitcoin around the world:
Different countries all over the world acted to bitcoin technology in a very different way. In the
following table, the reactions of the countries to bitcoin have been depicted:
Table-3: Present status of bitcoin around the world
Name of the country/region Action(s) taken
Australia, Canada, Estonia, France,
Germany, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Japan,
Jersey, Luxembourg,  The Netherlands,
Singapore, Switzerland and USA
Acted or are acting to
regulate bitcoin
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Iceland and
Kyrgyzstan Banned bitcoin
Brazil, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Italy,
Norway, Slovenia, Sweden and UK Stopped sort of regulating
bitcoin, but have imposed
taxes
China, Colombia, Israel, Lithuania,
Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines,
Russia, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan,
Ukraine and Vietnam
Undecided in respect of
digital currencies
Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Croatia,
Cyprus, United Arab Emirates, Ghana,
Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Malta, Malaysia,
Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
South Korea, Thailand, Turkey and
Venezuela
Do not regulate bitcoin
Source: Anderson et al., 2017
6. Future prospects:
The future of Bitcoin is very incomprehensible. This means the progression of Bitcoin can go in
any direction which is presently and slowly recounting before our very eyes. There are too many
speculations and opinions regarding what the future of bitcoin will look like. Until now, when
cataloging  out  the  wreckage,  three  dissimilar  possible  outcomes  go  up  on  top  of  the  rest
(Andersson and Wegdell, 2014): 
1. It  becomes  a  globally  recognized  currency,  used  all  over  the  place,  possibly,  even
eliminating cash and credit cards. 
2. It remains active and fine, but performing in the background. Rather than being a major
currency, it could function as an attribute and an accompaniment to the global financial
sector.  Exactly,  like  English  has  stretched  across  the  world  without  taking  out  each
existing language in its trail, bitcoin could spread across the world as a global payment
system, co-existing with other world currencies. 
3. Bitcoin prices collapse to their inherent value. It could be through a fizz or it fades away
over  time.  In  either  way  it  ceases  to  survive  in  the  public  eye  and  ultimately  gets
forgotten as the years pass on. 
No matter how possibly each option is can be extensively dubious and also, the probability in
variations of the different outcomes should be taken into consideration. An attempt to describe
the different scenarios has been made below:
6.1 A globally acknowledged currency:
Even though it seems almost impossible now, a few voices saying bitcoin could become a global
currency. In order for this to take place, the whole world has to be “on the same wave length”.
Such incident will not happen if all the requirements for a currency are satisfied, the three being:
unit of account, medium of exchange and store of value (Andersson and Wegdell, 2014). 
The first one, performing as a medium of exchange has been already somewhat achieved. There
are ample ways of spending bitcoins and a lot of diverse services obtainable for the transactions
to take place. Bitcoin’s technological drawing allows for swift transactions and as there is no
third  party  that  requires  authenticating  the  legality  of  the  transaction,  fees  are  low.  (The
Economist, 2014). All merchandise are, however, not tradable on the bitcoin market, but is does
not take away the precondition to function as a medium of exchange.
Bitcoin fulfills the obligation in the sense that it can be traded and stored for future use. The
complicated element is achieving steadiness in the value of a bitcoin, as it lacks inherent value
and is priced exclusively after demand (Yermack, 2013). One can guess with next to confidence
how much 100 USD today will be worth one year from now, considering only current inflation.
The price of a bitcoin, however, is very volatile; and there is no guarantee that one’s bitcoins will
be value as much, in even a few weeks’ time. Such volatility makes the currency extremely
vulnerable to speculative attacks, in another words, the consequences of group psychology and
collective speculation for both bull and bear markets (Andersson and Wegdell, 2014). 
Out of the three requirements, the one which is the furthest away from being fulfilled today is
that it functions as a unit of account. In order to be truly accepted and adopted a currency like
bitcoin, people must begin to “think in bitcoins”, e. g. asking themselves how much things cost
in  bitcoin,  rather  than bitcoin  converted into dollars  (Andersson and Wegdell,  2014).  If,  for
example, someone buys a coffee for $4 and the price is changed to $2 the next day, he/she can
say with certainty that the coffee is now half the price from what it was earlier. This does not
apply to bitcoin payments, as the value is too unstable. Although priced identically (in bitcoin)
for two consecutive days, the price of the coffee during day two (in USD) could be half the price,
twice the price, ten times the price or whatever the currency happens to be on that day. This
means that sellers who accept bitcoin payments constantly must adjust the prices of their goods,
in order for them to represent their current value in USD (Yermack, 2013). 
A number of people around the globe, are using bitcoin as is anticipated, hoping one day it will
be acknowledged as a globally accepted currency. For bitcoin to function as a currency, it is also
essential that the velocity increases and more people start using it to purchase goods and services
but at present, the typical users do not. The majority of users so far are speculative investors who
have recently seen the possibilities of an investment profit, as the media coverage increased and
the price skyrocketed (Andersson and Wegdell, 2014). According to Fred Ersham, co-founder of
the digital  wallet  service “Coinbase”,  approximately 80 percent  of the transaction  activity  is
related to speculation. (Goldman Sachs, 2014).
6.2 Complementary and attributive currency: 
If  Bitcoin could by some means become a more controlled and stable currency,  this  way of
transferring money globally has the prospective of entirely knocking out its present competition
(e.  g.  cash  offices).  In  2013,  remittances  sent  by  immigrants  to  developing  33  countries
amounted to $ 401 billion dollars and this is projected to increase to $ 515 billion by 2015. (The
World Bank, 2013).  This money usually flows through third parties such as MoneyGram or
Western Union. In the 1st quarter of 2014, the global average total price of remittances was 8.36
percent, which was a lifetime low. (The World Bank, 2014) For this reason, bitcoin has a huge
advantage to cash offices for using it as a medium of exchange. In this case, the volatility would
not be a very big obstacle either. Money could be exchanged to bitcoins, cheaply sent across the
world and exchanged back to a regular currency although for doing this, the recipient must have
an account on an exchange platform in order to sell  the bitcoin and receive the money.  The
exchange used must also be able to provide withdrawals in the currency wanted; and presently,
many developing countries do not provide this service (Andersson and Wegdell, 2014).
In addition to having a wide range of applications, bitcoin can also give rise to new lines of
products and services such as the possibility of micro-payments. Until now, micropayments of
less than $1 have seen little success due to the impracticalities that follow a transaction of this
kind. Bitcoin enables extremely small  payments  at  a reasonable cost;  making the market  for
micro-payment services very much alive, in a way they have not been before. This would enable
a more convenient “pay as you go” world where people could pay very small amounts for very
small services or goods. Present transaction fees (using for example Visa, MasterCard or PayPal)
make these types of purchases impractical as they easily could be equal to, or even more than,
the  actual  purchase  price  itself  (Andersson  and  Wegdell,  2014).  One  example  of  a  micro-
payment like this could be paying for WiFi access by the kilobyte, whenever passing a WiFi
hotspot (Bitcoin.org.).
Some other positive characteristics of bitcoin, besides micro-payments and the cost efficiency
are  its  global  accessibility,  the  possibility  of  multi-signature  accounts  and  simplifying
donations/crowdfunding. The global accessibility makes everyone with an internet connection
allowed  to  take  part  of  the  network,  increasing  global  access  to  commerce  and  potentially
helping international trade flourish. Multi-signature accounts allow accounts to be shared by 34
groups of people and do not allow any transactions to take place unless all the members are
unanimous about it. This could be of great value to for example a board of directors, to make
sure no company money is spent without the knowledge of the rest (Bitcoin.org.).
Crowdfunding is a type of fund raising, when members of a group each contribute with a small
amount of money and collectively working towards a unanimous economic goal. This could be a
project such as a non-profit, political or philanthropic campaign. (Canada Media Fund, 2012)
With the help of technology of bitcoin,  there is the possibility of even pledging money to a
project, but not collecting it from anyone until the main economic target is reached (Andersson
and Wegdell, 2014). 
When the  website  WikiLeaks  announced  that  they were  in  need of  donations  to  be  able  to
continue their work, both Visa and MasterCard denied donations from the general public (due to
political pressure), making donations in bitcoin skyrocket instead (Matonis, 2012). The reson is
that bitcoin transaction cannot be stopped by any authority. Also, in case of a catastrophe, such
as a natural disaster or something similar, bitcoin donations could be very useful in quickly and
cheaply organizing an international response and the money would arrive long before any normal
currency could (Andersson and Wegdell, 2014). 
The fact that money can be programmable opens up a world of possibilities. It could be regarded
as  an extrinsic  value,  e.  g.  the value  assigned to  an object  via  external  factors.  Things  like
“earmarking” money could become common in the future. This would make money impossible
to spend, unless spent in the way it is intended. It might be programming economic support to
third world countries so they can only be used for medical treatment/food and not for weapons or
it might be parents programming their children’s allowances so that they cannot buy cigarettes or
alcohol, but they can buy school lunches etc. (Andersson and Wegdell, 2014). This way it would
have similarities with today’s system with food stamps for people on financial support in the US.
Other applications for programmed money are cloud services. Money can be stored in clouds and
programmed to be released, piece by piece or all at once, at a given point in time. This could be
for example on a child’s 18th birthday or even after one’s death. (Wilhelm, 2013).
6.3 Fading away or crashing: 
On the occasion of Bitcoin becoming extinct, it seems that there are two possible ways it might
do so. It will either gradually die, as people lose hope and interest for it; or something extreme
might  happen that  makes  the public  interest  change overnight  from great  to non-existent.  In
either way, this would have to be something so major that Bitcoin cannot fight back against it
(Andersson and Wegdell, 2014).
6.3.1 Ponzi scheme: 
A Ponzi scheme  (sometimes known as  Ponzi game) is a fraudulent investment operation where
the operator provides fabricated reports and generates returns for older investors through revenue
paid  by  new  investors,  rather  than  from  legitimate  business  activities  or  profit  of financial
trading.  Operators  of  ponzi  schemes  can  be  either  individuals  or  corporations,  and grab the
attention  of  new investors  by offering  short-term returns  that  are  either  abnormally  high  or
unusually consistent (Frankel, 2012). 
There are a number of theories in circulation regarding why bitcoin was formed. As mentioned
earlier, one theory is that the idea was formed as a reaction to the global financial crisis in 2008,
when  there  was  great  malcontent  concerning  the  present  financial  system.  The  idea  of  a
decentralized  currency  may  have  many  positive  sides  but  it  has  some  flipsides  too  such
instability and no safety net for users. The reality that it could be a trick in disguise is also a
possibility that cannot be completely lined out. Some skeptics (for instance American economist
Nouriel Roubini) have emphasized this approach and point at the fact that it could all be a huge
ponzi scheme (Andersson and Wegdell, 2014).
A  Ponzi  scheme  is  an  unsustainable  business  model  that  promises  the  investor  great  profit
opportunities. It is made possible in the short run, due to the fact that these profit returns are in
fact actually money collected from new investors and given to old investors. These new investors
in turn get their returns paid by even newer investors and thus, the pyramid grows and creates
instead an illusion that all Participants are profiting off a legitimate business (FBI, n.d.). 
A ponzi scheme is unsustainable in the long run as it will only be able to operate as long as more
people join and supply a steady new flow of money. In another words, dependent on an ever-
growing supply of enthusiastic  participants  and in time it  will  always collapse.  The collapse
happens due to two reasons: when the original operator disappears with all the money or when
no new participants can be found to supply previous investors with the money promised to them.
(FBI, n.d.)
There  is  a  risk  that  people  like  Satoshi  Nakamoto  (and  the  early  adopters),  who  have
accumulated millions of dollars, might one day start selling their bitcoins and pulling out. This
scenario can happen without the rest of the world acknowledging it and realizing the “scammers”
are deserting it. Soon after, the fairytale is likely to be over. The price could fall helplessly and
there will be no regulations whatsoever to help innocent third party investors who have exposed
themselves to the risks. The similarities with a classic “pump and dump” strategy will become
obvious and hard to ignore. Attempts have been made to estimate how many bitcoins the founder
Satoshi Nakamoto is sitting on and the number is expected to be around 1 million BTC, making
him worth approximately $1 billion in December 2013 (Andersson and Wegdell, 2014).
7. Conclusion:
We  have  observed  gold  became  cash  and  cash  became  credit  cards.  Is  the  next  step
cryptocurrencies? It would be interesting to see whether bitcoin finds a place in our financial
world today. It is very unlikely to consider it becoming a real currency. Its properties are poorer
on all aspects of being a performing currency besides acting as a medium of exchange. In theory,
one solution to solve the store of value problem could be to nail it to, for example, the US dollar,
making it more stable and predictable. Also, the unit of account difficulties would grasp to exist
as people could more easily measure and compare prices and goods in bitcoin. But, in reality,
this  will  never  happen  since  the  bitcoin  network  is  programmed  to  be  decentralized  and
unmanageable. The whole idea of bitcoin is that it is independent from a central entity and the
price will go wherever the market drives it and legislation cannot solve this since it would entail
a comprehensive conformity.
Bitcoin,  without a doubt might be considered a radical innovation.  Considering our focus on
being a means of payment, it has the prospect to compel the existing system to adapt to it and
thus, become more competent than it is today.  As exactly in the similar way the possibility of
illegal  downloading has transformed the music and movie industry;  the possibility of wiring
money, virtually for free has the power to beat out its rivalry if no response to it is shown. 
In conclusion it can be believed that bitcoin does have the prospective for a greater universal
acceptance, depending upon the focus is on quick, cheap, convenient transactions. This would
necessitate  simple,  more  consumer  friendly  services,  even  for  those  who  do  not  wish  to
understand the technicalities behind it. The path to such permanent establishment requires that
the system remains fully transparent and secure, that a network effect takes place and that the
bitcoin ecosystem is strengthened and made more dependable. Bitcoin might not by definition be
a new currency, but it has placed a foundation for potentially improving money as we know it
now.
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